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such agreements is economics. In other words, countries enter into regional integration agreements because integration promises various economic benefits. In the short run, integration is expected to stimulate intra-regional trade and investment; in the longer run, it is hoped that the combination of larger markets, tougher competition, more efficient resource allocation, and various positive externalities will raise the growth rates of the participating economies. Far from taking place in a single global market, more than 80% of foreign direct investment and over half of the world trade take place in regional blocks. (Rugman, 2000) The relation between trade agreements such as CAFTA-DR and foreign direct investment is multi-dimensional in nature thus posing difficulties for static studies. For example, regional integration will have different impacts on investors from the participating economies and outside investors. The impact may vary depending on the character of existing foreign direct investment: horizontal and vertical investment, or import-substituting and export-oriented investment. In addition, integration between developed countries differs from integration between developing countries depending on how competitive and complementary the economies are. (Blomström & Kokko, 2009 ).
FDI and Barriers to Trade
Even though reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers are major features of all regional integration agreements, inward and outward investments are affected in different ways by regional integration. An important provision of CAFTA-DR is that each member country will eliminate export subsidies on agricultural goods destined for member countries which would increase trade. In addition, the investor protection provisions are expected to increase FDI in the region. This surge of inward FDI may not necessarily be evenly distributed, but rather concentrated to the geographical areas with the strongest locational advantages . In the case of Costa Rica, due to the current economical and industrial development level, it is expected that FDI inflows resulting from the treaty will be primarily directed towards the services and manufacturing sectors. (Trejos et al., 2007; MongeGonzalez et al., 2004) 
Internalizing Firm-Specific Intangible Assets
One important theoretical development in the literature on multinational corporations and FDI is the recognition that the exploitation of intangible assets, such as marketing and technological expertise is often a major motive for foreign investment (Blomström & Kokko, 1997) . As in the models where trade barriers motivate FDI, internalization theories imply that inflows of FDI from outsiders are likely to increase as a result of regional integration. (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977) . The CAFTA-DR provisions studied in this paper are expected to be good motives for increasing foreign investment in Costa Rica. 
CAFTA-DR Framework
While implementation of CAFTA-DR has not been uniform, all signatory countries have made progress in implementing the agreement. However, the debate on the agreement's merit continues. Supporters of CAFTA envision its implementation as the next step after the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) toward achieving a hemispheric free trade agreement. On the other hand, opponents are not persuaded the agreement will benefit all signatory countries and argue that it has not been established whether Central American signatories are economically and politically well suited for inclusion in this new free trade zone. Critics have questioned the advisability of adopting another free trade agreement in light of U.S. experiences under NAFTA. Concerns range from potential negative effects on the economic competitiveness of Central American farmers to threats of further job losses faced by American manufacturing workers. Given these publicly expressed concerns, there is no uniform support for CAFTA-DR's implementation.
Furthermore, there are equally significant concerns about CAFTA-DR's nature and structure regarding its legal effects. (Byrnes, 2009) The CAFTA-DR agreement extended immediate duty free access to more than half of all U.S. agricultural exports. Average tariffs applied by the member countries to imports of agricultural products from the United States exceed 11% and on certain import sensitive products, can be more than 150%. Tariffs on the most sensitive agricultural products will be phased out over periods ranging from five to 20 years. Liberalization will be undertaken using tariff-rate quotas. (Clark, 2009) Some of the concerns about the negative impacts of the agreement are summarized in the following to analyze the interaction of several variables in the economy as opposed to the unidirectional impact of exogenous variables on a dependent variable. Finally, system dynamics models have been previously used in policy studies as they can illustrate the effect of the policy in both short-run and long-run (Fiddaman; 2007; Thompson & Tebbens, 2008) .
Costa Rica has a long experience in open trade practices and in the establishment of free trade agreements. In Costa Rica, the CAFTA-DR negotiations were accompanied by intense public debate which had an impact on the presidential elections. Despite the ongoing debate, implementation of the treaty began in January, 2009.
Model Scope, Assumptions and Limitations
In general the CAFTA-DR's provisions are expected to increase the overall FDI inflows.
Particularly in Costa Rica, according to Trejos et al. (2007) , it is expected that the manufacturing sector will benefit the most from the additional FDI expected as a result of implementing the treaty due to the economical level of development the country. On the other hand, it is also expected that the agricultural sector will not exhibit a sustained growth because of the inability to compete with other member countries which in turn will increase the unemployment rate in this sector. (Trejos et al., 2007) .
The basic interaction of the System Dynamics model of CAFTA-DR is the cause and effect of an increase of FDI on the manufacturing and agricultural sectors and on their respective workforce. For modeling purposes, we assume that the number of manufacturing firms will increase as a result of the additional FDI inflows and the number of agricultural firms will decrease due to external competitiveness and other factor. We also assume that 
N i,t+1 = N i,t + i i,t -o i,t
The new firm establishment and closure rate is affected by the demand-supply ratio. If the demand exceeds the production capacity, new firms will be established to capitalize on the market opportunity. On the other hand, firms will close-down if the production capacity is beyond the demand due to the lack of market. The firm establishment rate is also affected by the number of workers available for hiring. If the number of available workers is limited, firms are reluctant to expand or establish new subsidiaries. The demand-supply ratio is calculated from the difference between the production capacity P and the demand D as a ratio of the capacity. The vacancy ratio which is calculated by dividing the difference between the number of jobs J and the number of worker W over the number of jobs J represents the worker's availability. The firm's establishment and closure rate is also affected by other factors which are not included in the model. We assume the normal firm establishment ratio Ω and normal firm closure ratio Ψ to capture the effect of other variables.
The production capacity P is calculated from the number of jobs provided by each firm.
We assume that the average number of jobs each firm offers Φ is constant over the simulation duration. The productivity rate Λ is the product quantity each worker can produce, and is also constant.
L is the product demand acquired from the local demand plus the export volume minus the import volume. The local demand is assumed to be constant. Export and imports are determined by the manufacturing volumes, thus an increase in manufacturing is determined solely by the profit margin of exporting from the US to Costa Rica. M is the import margin and X is the export margin that comes from exporting from Costa Rica to the US which is affected by taxes and tariffs.
The number of workers W is determined adding the number of workers in the previous year and the new hired workers w minus the workers that leave to other sectors. We assume that workers are move freely between sectors and that the movement is due solely to the wage premium S. The amount of workers being hired in each period is limited by the number of vacant position at the target sector and the number of workers from the source sector that are willing to move based on the salary. Unemployed workers are assumed to be seeking for and willing to get any vacant position. We also assume that manufacturing positions have higher priority as compared to positions in the agricultural sector.
( )
The number of unemployed people can increase from the workers being laid off from the firm closure. The number of workers being laid off is calculated from the number of closure firms, the average jobs per firm, and the vacancy ratio.
Finally, the worker's wages are represented by S. The wages are assumed to change based on the vacancy ratio. If the number of vacant positions is higher, firms will increase the salary to attract more potential workers.
IV. MODEL VALIDATION
In order to validate the model we used real data for total export by sector, total import by 
V. RESULTS
In order to see the effects of the changes of some the variables described above the model was simulated. The effects of the variable changes can be observed in the graphs as "if-then"
type scenarios. Figure 3 shows a line called "cafta" in which the variables are set as if CAFTA-DR has been implemented (line markers labeled with number 2). The "no cafta" line (line markers labeled with number 1) illustrates the effect if we consider that the treaty is not implemented. Specifically Figure 3 indicates that if the treaty is implemented then the workforce in the manufacturing sector would increase at a faster rate than if the treaty is not implemented. Therefore, according to this result, the general expectation of CAFTA-DR benefiting the manufacturing sectors would indeed seem to be the case.
Figure 3: Workforce trend in the manufacturing sector with and without CAFTA-DR
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 4 , the model indicates that the workforce in the agricultural sector would decrease if the treaty is implemented, whereas if the treaty is not implemented the agricultural workforce would continue to increase steadily although eventually it would level off. In the model the agricultural workforce decreases mainly because the number of agricultural firms decreases. This means that after the implementation of the treaty, unemployment in the agricultural sector would increase.
Figure 4: Workforce trend in the agricultural sector with and without CAFTA-DR
However, according to the model, it can be observed that eventually the unemployment in the agricultural sector would curb down if the treaty is in place, otherwise unemployment in this sector would continue to increase and perhaps curb down at much later point in time. In Figure 4 , most likely the pattern displayed by the curve labeled with 2 is due to an improved ability of the manufacturing sector of absorbing the agricultural workforce at a faster rate if the treaty is implemented.
In looking at the unemployment in both sectors in Figure 5 shows that in both cases ("cafta", "no cafta") there is an initial increase of the unemployment ratio. However, in the case of CAFTA, the unemployment ratio has a steeper increase but it also drops faster than without CAFTA. In other words the country would not necessarily be able to measure or witness the benefits in the very short run, but it certainly seems that in the long run the treaty would be beneficial.
Figure 5: Unemployment ratio trend with and without CAFTA-DR

VI. CONCLUSIONS
The debate and close vote on CAFTA-DR in Costa Rica reflected the strong opposition to the treaty of many NGOs and labor and civil society organizations, largely amid fears that it would negatively affect Costa Rican agricultural and industrial sectors. Much of the fear has, so far, been unfounded and Costa Rican agricultural imports and exports have continued to increase since CAFTA-DR. Overall, Costa Rica remains relatively unaffected, but gains under free trade agreements in general favor large-scale agri-businesses, not farmers (Trejos, et al. 2007 ).
The implementation of new policies and laws has effects on the general development of a country's economy. Sometimes the effects are unsatisfactory, other times are successful, and often it is not well known its direct or indirect effects on the economy. On balance, based on this paper's model it can be concluded that CAFTA-DR policies of modifying export tariffs and providing investor protections policies are going to positively affect in the long run FDI inflows in the form of an increase of manufacturing firms. As a consequence of the positive FDI inflows, the manufacturing sector would develop further but the agricultural sector will not directly benefit from the FDI inflows. However, according to the model simulation results, the scenario in which the treaty is implemented shows that there would be a decrease in the agricultural workforce, but the chances that this workforce is absorbed into the manufacturing sector is higher if the treaty is implemented than if it is not.
There are several possible extensions to the model, which are worth mentioning. First, unintended effects such as growing inequality and ongoing poverty are not predictable using the current model. The model can be refined in order to discern those unintended policy effects. Finally, it is possible that in the short term, the negative effects mentioned on Table 1 will be observable, however, as previously mentioned, in the long-term the intended benefits have a higher probability of occurring.
